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Abstract
Experiments motivated by Bell’s theorem have led some physicists
to conclude that quantum theory is nonlocal. However, the theoreti-
cal basis for such claims is usually taken to be Bell’s Theorem, which
shows only that if certain predictions of quantum theory are correct,
and a strong hidden-variable assumption is valid, then a certain lo-
cality condition must fail. This locality condition expresses the idea
that what an experimenter freely chooses to measure in one spacetime
region can have no effect of any kind in a second region situated space-
like relative to the first. The experimental results conform closely to
the predictions of quantum theory in such cases, but the most rea-
sonable conclusion to draw is not that locality fails, but rather that
the hidden-variable assumption is false. For this assumption conflicts
with the quantum precept that unperformed experiments have no out-
comes. The present paper deduces the failure of this locality condition
directly from the precepts of quantum theory themselves, in a way
that generates no inconsistency or any conflict with the predictions of
relativistic quantum field theory.
∗This work was supported in part by the Director, Office of Science, Office of High
Energy and Nuclear Physics, of the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC03-
76SF00098.
1. Introduction.
A recent issue of Physics Today[1] has a bulletin entitled “Nonlocality
Get More Real”. It reports experiments at three laboratories (Geneva [2],
Innsbruck[3], and Los Alamos[4]) directed at closing loopholes in proofs that
quantum phenomena cannot be reconciled with classical ideas about the local
character of the physical world.
The experiment reported in the first of these papers [2] confirms the exis-
tence of a classically unexplainable connection between phenomena appearing
at essentially the same time in two villages separated by a distance of more
than 10km, and the paper begins with the provocative statement “Quantum
theory is nonlocal.” The longer version [5] says “Today, most physicists are
convinced that a future loophole-free test will definitely demonstrate that
nature is indeed nonlocal.”
The theoretical basis for such claims is usually taken to be Bell’s The-
orem, which, however, shows only that if certain predictions of quantum
theory are correct, and if a certain hidden-variable assumption is valid, then
a locality condition must fail. This locality condition expresses the physical
idea, suggested by the theory of relativity, that what an experimenter freely
chooses to measure in one spacetime region can have no effect of any kind in
a second region situated spacelike relative to the first.
The experimental results conform closely to the predictions of quantum
theory in such cases, but the most natural conclusion to draw is not that lo-
cality fails, but rather that the hidden-variable assumption is false. For the
“hidden-variable assumption” of Bell’s original theorem[6] is basically the
assumption that a set of possible outcomes can be simultaneously defined
for each of the alternative mutually incompatible experiments that the ex-
perimenters might choose to perform. This assumption violates the precepts
of quantum philosophy by assigning definite, albeit unknown, values to the
outcomes of mutually incompatible measurements.
Bell[7] later introduced a seemingly weaker local hidden-variable assump-
tion, but it can be shown[8,9] that this later form entails the original one,
apart from errors that tend to zero as the number of experiments tends to
infinity. Thus both forms of the hidden-variable assumption contradict the
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basic quantum precept that one cannot, in general, consistently assign pos-
sible outcomes to unperformed measurements. Hence, from the viewpoint of
orthodox quantum theory, Bell’s hidden-variable assumption, in either form,
is more likely to fail than the locality condition. Consequently, these hidden-
variable theorems provides no adequate basis for the claim that “Quantum
theory is nonlocal”, or that “nature is indeed nonlocal.”
The present paper describes a fundamentally different kind of proof. It
shows that a violation of the locality condition described above follows logi-
cally from assumptions that formalize the precepts of orthodox of quantum
theory itself. This proof is logically rigorous. But like all proofs and the-
orems of this general kind it is based essentially on the use of statements
about contrary-to-fact situations.
I have just mentioned that the basic principles of quantum philosophy
forbid the unrestricted use of contrary-to-fact, or counterfactual notions. So
it might be thought that the new proof is basically no better than the ones
employing hidden-variables. However, there is an essential logical difference
between the two proofs: Bell’s hidden-variable assumption was an ad hoc
assumption that had no foundation in the quantum precepts. Indeed, it di-
rectly contradicted the quantum precepts. Moreover, it led, when combined
with the predictions of quantum theory, to logical inconsistencies. This latter
fact vindicates the quantum precept that bans the hidden-variable assump-
tion, and thus undermines the significance of any conclusions derived from
that assumption.
The proof to be presented here differs from the hidden-variable theorems
in two crucial ways. First, as just mentioned, the assumptions are direct
expressions of the precepts of orthodox quantum precepts themselves, rather
than being, as regards the hidden-variable aspect, a direct violation of those
precepts. Second, the assumptions used in the present proof, lead only to
a very restricted set of true counterfactual statements, and these lead nei-
ther to any logical contradiction, nor to any conflict with the predictions
of relativistic quantum field theory. Thus the proof to be presented here
lies on a logical level different from that of the proofs that follows Bell’s
hidden-variable approach.
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What assumptions are used in the present approach?
The first assumption is that, for the purposes of understanding and ap-
plying quantum theory, the choice of which experiment is to be performed
can be treated as a free variable. Bohr repeatedly stressed this point, which
is closely connected to his “complementarity” idea that the quantum state
contains complementary kinds of information pertaining to the various alter-
native mutually exclusive experiments that might be chosen. Of course, only
one or the other of two mutually incompatible measurements can be actually
performed, not both, and only a measurement that is actually performed can
be assumed to have a definite outcome.
It is worth recalling in this connection that Bohr did not reject the ar-
gument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen out of hand, simply because it
involves considering two mutually incompatible experiments. Bohr accepted
that feature of the argument, and was therefore forced to find another, much
more subtle, ground for rejecting the argument of those authors, which, like
the one to be presented here, but unlike those of Bell, scrupulously avoids any
direct assumption that an unperformed experiment has a definite outcome.
The second assumption of the present work is that an outcome that has
appeared to observers in one spacetime region, and has been recorded there,
can be considered to be fixed and settled by the time the observations and
recordings are completed: this outcome is treated as being independent of
which experiment will be freely chosen and performed by another experi-
menter acting in a spacetime region lying later than the first region. This
no-backward-in-time-influence property is assumed to hold in at least one
Lorentz frame, which I shall call LF.
These two assumptions immediately entail the truth of a very limited class
of counterfactual statements. These are statements of the form: If experi-
ments E and F are freely chosen and performed in earlier and later regions,
respectively, and the outcome in the earlier region is E+, then the outcome
in the earlier region would (still) be E+ if everything in nature were the same
except for (1), a different free choice made in the later region, and (2), the
possible consequences of making that alternate later free choice instead of the
actual free choice. The no-backward-in-time-influence condition asserts that
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the possible consequences of the experimenter’s making the alternate (i.e.,
counterfactual) later free choice do not include any change of an outcome
that has already appeared to observers in the earlier spacetime region, and
has been recorded there.
This assumption of no backward-in-time action is the expression of a
theoretical idea: it can never be empirically confirmed. On the other hand,
it is completely compatible with all the predictions of quantum theory, and
with all the properties of relativistic quantum field theory. This will be
shown later. Thus it provides for an enlargement of the quantum-theoretical
framework that allows one to consistently consider alternative possible “free
choices.”
Any physicist is certainly free to deny this assumption that a later free
choice cannot affect an already-observed-and-recorded outcome. Hence my
proof must be regarded as an exploration of the logical consequences of mak-
ing this foray into the realm of counterfactuals. This excursion is needed in
order to formulate the concept of “no influence” that is under consideration,
and to give some effective meaning to the notion of a “free choice.”
Notice that there is no direct assumption that some unperformed experi-
ment has an outcome. In the first place, the effective replacement assumption
is that there is no influence backward in time. This assertion is part of the
very assumption that is under examination, rather than a direct negation
of a basic quantum precept. In the second place, the measurement whose
outcome is counterfactually specified to be E+ is exactly the locally defined
experiment E that is assumed to be the experiment that is actually per-
formed at the earlier time. This earlier experiment and its outcome is “un-
performed” or “counterfactual” only in a theoretical nonlocal and atemporal
sense, when it is considered in combination with a never-to-be-performed
later experiment. The no-backward-in-time-influence assumption is essen-
tially the assumption that this earlier locally characterized measurement E
is one and the same measurement no matter which free choice is made later
on. In this local sense there is no assumption about the outcome of any un-
performed measurement: the single locally defined earlier measurement has
one single outcome no matter which free choice is made later on.
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Logicians have developed rigorous logical frameworks for consistent and
unambiguous reasoning with statements involving counterfactual conditions.
Those frameworks incorporate certain ideas about the world that are concor-
dant with a deterministic classical-physics conception of nature. The present
proof can be carried out within such a classical framework. However, the
indeterminism of quantum physics leads naturally to a quantum logic for
counterfactual reasoning. I shall, in Appendix A, present a rigorous for-
mal proof within this quantum counterfactual logic, which is described in
Appendix B.
This proof shows that in a certain (Hardy) experimental setup a statement
can be constructed whose truth value (true or false) is defined in terms of the
truth values of some statements pertaining to possible outcomes of possible
experiments confined to a certain spacetime region R, but that this statement
is, by virtue of certain predictions of quantum theory, true if one experiment
is chosen and performed by an experimenter in an earlier (in LF) region L
that is spacelike separated from region R, but is false if a different experiment
is chosen and performed in that earlier region L. This non-trivial dependence
upon a free choice made in one region of the truth of a statement specified by
the truth or falsity of statements pertaining to possible events in a spacelike
separated region, constitutes, within this logical framework, some kind kind
of faster-than-light influence, as will be discussed.
The quantum counterfactual logic described in appendix B is, I believe,
interesting in itself, as is the formal proof given in Appendix A. They give
precision and rigor to the argument. However, the argument is so intu-
itively obvious that I believe it is sufficient to state it in plain words. This
is done in the next section. Then in section 3 it is shown, by referring
to the Tomonaga-Schwinger formulation of quantum field theory, that the
assumptions and conclusions of the proof are logically compatible with the
predictions of relativistic quantum field theory. In section 4 I discuss the fact
that the proved result is incompatible with the notion that the free choice
made in one region can have no influence of any kind in a second region that
is spacelike separated from the first.
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2. The Informal Proof.
The argument is based on a Hardy-type [10] experimental set-up.
There are two experimental spacetime regions R and L, which are space-
like separated. In region R there are two alternative possible measurements,
R1 and R2. In region L there are two alternative possible measurements, L1
and L2. Each local experiment has two alternative possible outcomes, la-
belled by + and − . The symbol R1 appearing in a logical statement stands
for the statement “Experiment R1 is chosen and performed in region R.” The
symbol R1+ stands for the statement that “The outcome ‘+’ of experiment
R1 appears in region R.” Analogous statements with other variables have the
analogous meanings.
The detectors are assumed to be 100% efficient, so that for each possible
world some outcome, either + or −, will, according to quantum mechanics,
appear in R, and some outcome, either + or −, will appear in L.
Suppose Robert acts in region R, and Lois acts in region L. Then the
first two predictions of QT for this Hardy setup are these:
(2.1): If Robert perform R2 and gets outcome R2+ and Lois performs
L2, then Lois gets outcome L2+ .
(2.2): If Lois performs L2 and gets outcome L2+, and Robert performs
R1 , then Robert gets outcome R1−.
Combining these two conditions with the no-backward-in-time-influence
condition, which says that what Robert freely chooses to do in the later
region R cannot disturb Lois’s earlier outcome, one immediately obtains the
conclusion that:
If Lois performs L2 then
“If Robert performs R2 and gets R2+ then if his choice had gone the other
way he would have gotten outcome R1−.”
This conclusion is expressed by Line 5 of the formal proof.
The second two predictions of QT for this Hardy setup are:
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(2.3): If Lois performs L1 and get outcome L1−, and Robert performs
R2, then Robert gets outcome R2+.
(2.4): It is not true that If Lois perform L1 and gets outcome L1−, and
Robert performs R1 then Robert gets outcome R1−.
To deduce the desired conclusion one uses the fact that if Lois performs
L1 then quantum theory predicts that she gets L1− roughly half the time.
Thus there are physically possible worlds in which Lois performs L1 and gets
outcome L1−. In any such world if Robert chooses R2, then, according to
(2.3), he will obtain outcome R2+. According to our no-backward-in-time-
influence condition, the outcome L1− observed earlier by Lois would be left
unchanged if Robert had, later in R, made the other chioce, and performed
R1. But then prediction (2.4) of quantum theory ensures that there are
possible worlds in which Lois performs L1 and Robert performs R2 and gets
outcome R2+, but in which Robert would not have obtained outcome R1−
of he had freely chosen to perform R1 instead of R2. This means that
If Lois performs L1 then It is not true that
“If Robert performs R2 and gets R2+ then if his choice had gone the other
way he would have gotten outcome R1−.”
This is exactly what the rigorous formal proof shows.
Notice that this second conclusion, like the earlier one, contains the state-
ment SR:
“If Robert performs R2 and gets R2+ then if his choice had gone the
other way he would have gotten outcome R1-.”
This statement SR, whose truth or falsity is defined in terms of the truth
or falsity of statements pertaining to possible events in region R, is true
if Lois’s free choice in region L is to perform L2, but is not true if Lois’s
free choice in region L is to perform L1. Thus the truth of this statement
SR pertaining to region R depends upon what Lois freely chooses to do in
a region L that is situated spacelike relative to region R. This dependence
constitutes some kind of effect in region R of Lois’s free choice made in region
L. This is discussed in Section 4.
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3. Logical Consistency and Compatibility with Relativity.
The assumptions in this argument, unlike those of approaches based on
hidden variables, are in line with the precepts of orthodox quantum theory,
and when combined with the predictions of relativistic quantum field the-
ory they lead to no logical inconsistencies. One can confirm this by simply
noting that the no-backward-in-time-influence condition is satisfied in the
formulation of relativistic quantum field theory given by Tomonaga[11] and
by Schwinger[12], with their spacelike surfaces σ taken to be the constant-
time surfaces in the special frame LF. This frame then defines the meaning
of the evolving state Ψ(t), which can be assumed to collapse to a new state
when a measurement is completed, and new information is thus considered
to have become specified.
There is, of course, no suggestion in the works of Tomonaga and Schwinger
that some particular set of surfaces should be singled out as the “true” or
“real” surfaces that define the real evolving state of the universe Ψ(t) that
is suddenly reduced to a new form when new information becomes avail-
able. Quite the opposite: they show that it does not matter which of the
infinite collection of advancing sets of spacelike surfaces σ one uses to de-
fine the forward-evolving state of the system. They effectively show that the
predictions of the theory will be independent of which such set of advanc-
ing spacelike surfaces σ one uses. This feature of their theory is, of course,
completely concordant with the ideas of the theory of relativity.
My use of Tomonaga-Schwinger theory is a logical, not ontological, one. I
merely claim that my no-backward-in-time-influence assumption is logically
compatible with the predictions of relativistic quantum field theory: I make
no claim that this causality assumption has any ontological significance, or
that the particular frame LF is unique. On the other hand, I could not
demonstrate compatibility with the predictions of relativistic quantum field
theory if I tried to assert that the no-backward-in-time-influence condition
held simultaneously in several frames: Tomonaga-Schwinger theory does not
ensure the compatibility of that stronger condition with the predictions of
relativistic quantum field theory.
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4. Conclusion.
The two conclusions proved from our premises both involve the same
assertion SR:
“If Robert performs RA and gets RA+ then if his free choice in R had
gone the other way he would have gotten outcome RC−.”
Here A stands for actual, and takes the value 2, and C stands for coun-
terfactual, and takes the value 1.
What was proved is that this statement SR about the connections in R
of the consequences of making alternative possible free choices in R is, by
virtue of our explicity stated assumptions, true or false according to whether
L2 or L1 is freely chosen in L.
This conclusion entails that information about which choice is freely made
in region L must get to region R. This is because the truth value (true or
false) of SR is defined in terms of the truth values of the elements of the
quadruple of statement (RA,RA+;RC,RC−): SR, with A = 2 and C = 1,
is false if and only the set of truth values of that quadruple is (t, t; t, f).
For every other quadruple of truth values the statement SR is true. Thus
the nontrivial dependence of the truth of SR on the free choice between L1
and L2 made in region L means that the truth or falsity of some statements
about possible events in region R must, as a consequence of our assumptions,
depend upon whether the free choice made in region L is to perform L1 or
L2.
This result places a strong condition on theoretical models that reproduce
the predictions of quantum theory. This condition is similar to the failure
of locality associated with Bell’s theorem. But here it is derived from the
premises of “free choice” and “no backward in time influence” that are in
line with the precepts of quantum theory, and that lead to no logical con-
tradictions, and to no conflicts with the predictions of relativistic quantum
field theory.
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APPENDIX A: The Formal Proof.
Each line of the following proof is a strict consequence of the predictions
of quantum mechanics, (2.1)-(2.4), the general property that there are pos-
sible worlds W in which L1 is performed the outcome is L1−, the assumed
property LOC1, and the properties of the rudimentary logical symbols. Line
6 is the one exception: it is just the same as line 5, but with L2 replaced by
L1. The part of the proof from line 7 to line 14 shows that the statement
on line 6 is false. Thus the proof shows that mentioned premises lead to the
conclusion that line 5 is true, but that line 6 is false.
Proof:
1. (L2 ∧R2 ∧ L2+)⇒ [R1✷→ (L2 ∧ R1 ∧ L2+)] [(B.6)]
2. (L2 ∧R2 ∧ R2+)⇒ (L2 ∧R2 ∧ L2+) [(2.1)]
3. (L2 ∧R1 ∧ L2+)⇒ (L2 ∧ R1 ∧ R1−)] [(2.2)]
4. (L2 ∧R2 ∧ R2+)⇒ [R1✷→ (L2 ∧ R1 ∧R1−)] [1, 2, 3, (B.7)]
5. L2⇒ [(R2 ∧R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1 ∧ R1−)] [4, LOC1, (A.5)]
6. L1⇒ [(R2 ∧R2+)→ (R1✷→ R1 ∧ R1−)]
7. (L1 ∧R2 ∧ R2+)⇒ (R1✷→ R1 ∧R1−)] [6, (A.5)]
8. (L1 ∧R2 ∧ L1−)⇒ (L1 ∧R2 ∧ R2+) [(2.3)]
9. (L1 ∧R2 ∧ L1−)⇒ (R1✷→ R1 ∧R1−) [7, 8, (B.5)]
10. (L1 ∧ R2)⇒ [L1− → (R1✷→ R1 ∧R1−)] [9, (A.5)]
11. (L1 ∧ R2)⇒ [R1✷→ (L1− → R1 ∧R1−)] [10, LOC1]
12. (L1 ∧ R1)⇒ ¬(L1− → R1 ∧R1−) [(3.4)]
13. L1⇒ [R1→ ¬(L1− → R1 ∧ R1−)] [12, (A.5)]
14. (L1 ∧ R2)⇒ [R1✷→ ¬(L1− → R1 ∧ R1−)] [13, DEF.]
But the conjunction of 11 and 14 contradicts the assumption that the
experimenters in regions R and L are free to choose which experiments they
will perform, and that outcome L1− sometimes occurs under the conditions
that L1 and R1 are performed. Quantum theory predicts that if L1 and R1
are performed then outcome L1− occurs half the time. Thus the falseness of
the statement in line 6 is proved.
[Note that there is only one strict conditional [⇒] in each line. In an
earlier brief description[13] of a theorem similar to the one proved above,
but based on orthodox modal logic rather than the quantum logic developed
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above, some material conditionals standing to the right of this strict condi-
tional were mistakenly represented by the double arrow ⇒, rather than by
→. I thank Abner Shimomy and Howard Stein [14] for alerting me to this
notational error.]
The logical structure can be expressed in terms of sets. This provides a
compact method, accessible to interested physicists, for validating the various
lines of the proof.
For any statement S expressed in terms of the rudimentary logical con-
nections let {W : S} be the set of all (physically possible) worldsW such that
statement S is true at W (i.e., S is true in world W). Sometimes {W : S}
will be shortened to {S}.
A main set-theoretic definition is this: Suppose A and B are two state-
ments expressed in terms of the rudimentary logical connections. Then
A⇒ B is true if and only if the intersection of {A} and {¬B} is void:
[A⇒ B] ≡ [{A} ∩ {¬B} = ∅]. (A.1)
Equivalently, {A} is a subset of {B}:
[A⇒ B] ≡ [{A} ⊂ {B}]. (A.2)
Let (S)W mean that the statement S is true at W . Then
(A→ B)W ≡ [(¬A)W or (B)W ]. (A.3)
This entails that
{A→ B} ≡ ({¬A} ∪ {B}). (A.4)
Proof of (A.5)
Equation (A.5) reads:
[A⇒ (B → C)] ≡ [(A ∩ B)⇒ C]. (A.5)
This is equivalent to
[{A} ∩ {¬(B → C)} = ∅] ≡ [{A ∩ B} ∩ {¬C} = ∅]. (A.6)
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But {¬(B → C)} is the complement of {B → C}. Using (A.4), and the fact
that the complement of {¬B} ∪ {C} is {B} ∩ {¬C}, one obtains the needed
result.
Proof of line 5
Line 4 has the condition L2 appearing to the right of the counterfactual
condition R1. The counterfactual condition R1 changes R2 to R1, but leaves
L2 unchanged. Hence the L2 appearing on the right can be omitted, since it
appears already on the left. But then application of (2.1) gives the line 5.
Proof of line 12
Statement (3.4), expressed in the set-theoretic form, says there is some world
in {L1∧R1}∩{L1−} that is not in {R2−}. This entails that, in {L1∧R1},
there some world in {L1−} that is not in {R2−}. This is the form of (2.4)
given in line 12.
Proof of line 14
By definition, the assertion that [C✷ → D] is true in world W is equiv-
alent to the assertion that D is true in every possible world W ′ that differs
fromW only by possible effects of imposing condition C rather than whatever
condition in world W is directly contradicted by condition C.
In line 14 the world W can be any world in which L1 and R2 hold. And
W ′ can be any world that differs from W only by possible effects of changing
R2 to R1. But no matter what these possible changes are, the worldW ′ must
be a world in which L1 and R1 hold, and in any such world the statement
(L1− → R1 ∧ R1−) is false, by virtue of line 13. Thus line 14 is true.
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Appendix B. Quantum Logic for Counterfactuals
Within orthodox quantum theory, with its notion of free choices on the
part of the experimenters, and the notion of no-backward-in-time influence of
these free choices, logical reasoning covers unambiguously some statements
involving counterfactual conditions. The primary logical concept here is the
notion of a “logically possible world.” It will be enough to define it in the
case under consideration.
This case involves two spacelike-separated spacetime regions R and L,
and in each region two alternative mutually exclusive experiments, R1 and
R2, and L1 and L2, respectively. Each possible experiment has two possi-
ble outcomes, R1+ and R1−, etc. Thus there are in this situation sixteen
“logically possible worlds”, each one labelled by one of the four globally de-
fined experiments, (R1, L1), (R1, L2), (R2, L1), and (R2, L2), and by one
of the four possible outcomes of that globally defined experiment, (+,+),
(+,−),(−,+), and (−,−). This set of sixteen logically possible worlds is the
logical universe under consideration here. Each such “world” might better
be called a “world history”.
A physically possible world is logically possible world that by virtue of
the laws of nature (i.e., the predictions of quantum theory) has a non-null
probability to occur. The physically possible worlds are called “possible
worlds.” Normally, I omit also the word “possible”: unless otherwise stated
a “world” will mean a “physically possible world”.
The rudimentary logical relationships involve the terms “and”, “or”,
“equal” and “negation”. A rudimentary statement S involving these rela-
tions is said to be true in world W if and only if S is true by virtue of the
set of conditions that define W and the laws of nature.
The concept of “implication” occurs, but it is important to distinguish
between two different concepts.
The rudimentary relationship of implication is the so-called “material
conditional”. It is defined in terms of the rudimentary logical relationships
defined above, and it will be represented here by the single arrow →. By
definition:
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“(A→ B) is true in world W” is equivalent to
“ (A is false in W) or (B is true in W) ” . (B.1)
This rudimentary relationship is different from the logical relationship
called the “strict conditional”, which is represented here by the word “im-
plies”, and a double arrow. The statement “ ‘A is true’ implies ‘B is true’
” is sometimes shortened to “A implies B”, and is represented symbolically
here by
A⇒ B. (B.2)
By definition, A⇒ B is true if and only if for every (physically possible)
world W either “A is false in W” or “B is true in W”: i.e., for every (physically
possible) world W, the rudimentary statement (A→ B) is true in W.
The proof to be presented here is based on a causality condition called
LOC1. It expresses the condition that there is at least one Lorentz frame,
LF, such that if an experiment is performed and the outcome is recorded
prior to some time T , as measured in LF, then this outcome can be regarded
as fixed and settled, independently of which experiment will eventually be
freely chosen and performed (faraway) at a time later than T .
It is assumed that the regions L and R lie earlier and later that this time
T , respectively. Then LOC1 means that if Lois (acting in L) performs her
experiment before Robert (acting in R), we can safely assume that her result
does not depend on what Robert will do, but not vice-versa.
Logicians deal with statements of this kind by employing a third kind
of implication. It uses the concept “instead of”. This concept is of central
importance in classical counterfactual reasoning, and it has an unambiguous
meaning within our quantum context. That meaning is now explained.
Suppose that A represents some possible conditions that the experi-
menters could set up, and some conditions on the possible outcomes. [For
example, A could be the condition that Lois and Robert perform L2 and R2,
respectively, and that Lois gets outcome L2+]
Suppose condition C represents some free choice (by some experimenter)
that could conflict with A. [In the example, C could be “Robert performs
R1”].
Finally, suppose condition D represents some possible outcome that could
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occur if C were to hold “instead of”, whatever condition C contradicts. [In
the example, D could be “Lois gets outcome L2+,” or perhaps “Robert gets
outcome R1−.”]
Then consider a statement of the form:
“A implies [If, instead, C then D]” (B.3)
The phrase “If, instead, C then D” is traditionally represented symboli-
cally by [C✷→ D], and I shall use that symbolic form for the quantum ver-
sion defined here. Like all rudimentary statements the assertion [C✷→ D] it
is a statement that is made in one world, say W . But it is a statement about
about an entire set of worlds W ′, namely the set of all (physically possible)
worlds that differ from W only by possible consequences of choosing the ex-
perimental condition C instead of whatever condition in world W conflicts
with C.
Given this definition of [C✷→ D] the statement
A⇒ [C✷→ D] (B.4)
expresses the condition that, for all (physically possible) worlds W , if A is
true in W then then D is true in every (physically possible) world W ′ that
differs from W only by possible effects of choosing condition C instead of
whatever condition in W conflicts with C.
It is essential that this definition allows this statement to be combined
with other logical statements in an unambiguous way. In particular, the usual
laws of logic can be applied, without any change, to arguments involving
statements of this kind. Suppose, or example, that one has, in addition to
the truth of (B.4), also the truth of (B ⇒ A), which asserts that, for all W ,
if B is true in W then A is true in W . Then one can immediately conclude
from the meaning of (B.4) that
B ⇒ [C✷→ D]. (B.5)
The definition of [C ✷ → D] is general. But in order to make use of it
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one must have some condition on the “possible effects of choosing condition
C instead of whatever condition in world W conflicts with C.”
This is where LOC1 comes in. Suppose the region L, where Lois acts,
lies earlier than the region R, where Robert acts. Then LOC1 entails [with
“and” represented by ∧]
(L2 ∧R2 ∧ L2+)⇒ [R1✷→ (L2 ∧ R1 ∧ L2+)] (B.6)
This statement is true by virtue of the LOC1 premise that the outcome
that Lois gets, and also her free choice, do not depend on what Robert does
later.
Another example of the logical rules is this. Suppose that (B.5) is true.
And suppose that F is a condition on the outcome under the alternative
condition C, and that D ⇒ F is true. This is the condition that, for every
W ′, if D is true in W ′ then F is true in W ′. Then the meaning of (B.5),
as described above (B.4), with B in place of A, ensures that the following
statement is true:
B ⇒ [C✷→ F ]. (B.7)
This result is used to get line 4 of the proof given in Appendix A.
All the other lines of the proof given in Appendix A can be strictly de-
duced, in a similar way, from just the meanings of the logical symbols, the
predictions of quantum theory, and the property LOC1.
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